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2021年3月22日星期一

For my Readers from Myanmar

You may be interested in the following articles:

Myanmar: The unfinished business of an unfolding coup

Derek Aw

Control Risks (Mar 3, 2021)

https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/myanmar-the-unfinished-business-of-an-unfolding-coup?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=&utm_content=apac

Extract: Although the Tatmadaw’s political adventurism has clearly had damaging consequences for the business environment in Myanmar, the new military government seems to be taking pains to present itself to foreign investors and domestic corporate groups as being pro-business.

The Tatmadaw’s ostensive pursuit of legitimacy does not entirely bode well for foreign businesses in Myanmar. Given their obvious intent, newly revised and future security policies of the military government sharpen ethical dilemmas for foreign companies. Foreign businesses are likely to be subject to new variations of safety, ethical and reputational risks. Companies are and will be faced with complying with requirements mandated by Myanmar laws on one hand, and their commitment to international norms and duty of care for their staff on the other. The Tatmadaw could also exert political and regulatory pressure on businesses involved in any commercial activity that has security or legitimacy implications for the Tatmadaw, including banking, telecommunications, media, mass transport and infrastructure. 

Many foreign businesses could find themselves in the crossfire of a propaganda battle between the military government and the protest movement. Perceptions that a foreign company – or their domestic partner – is conferring legitimacy to the military government by engaging with it could make the company the target of a boycott campaign or anti-coup demonstrations, within or outside Myanmar.

Although the Tatmadaw will be able to adapt and respond to some events that it might not have initially accounted for, what decision-makers should keep a close eye on are new and specifically disruptive forms of popular resistance that take the military by surprise or are outside its leaders’ comfort zone. For example, the pro-democracy movement has sustained disruptions in the banking system in a concerted attempt to force the Tatmadaw to give up power. The ongoing banking stalemate potentially marks the first acute juncture at which the Tatmadaw’s apparent resolve, in terms of avoiding widespread and repeated use of lethal force, will be put to the test. These disruptions – along with widespread calls to withdraw as much cash from military-owned banks that serve as financial vehicles for the military’s business empire – are potential watersheds that could bring forward the moment of truth and provoke the military to reveal its tooth and claw.

Exclusive: U.S. blocked Myanmar junta attempt to empty $1 billion New York Fed account - sources

By Simon Lewis, Humeyra Pamuk

Reuters (Mar 5, 2021)

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-usa-fed-exclusive-idUSKCN2AW2MD

Extract: Myanmar’s military rulers attempted to move about $1 billion held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York days after seizing power on Feb. 1, prompting U.S. officials to put a freeze on the funds, according to three people familiar with the matter, including one U.S. government official.

The transaction on Feb. 4 in the name of the Central Bank of Myanmar was first blocked by Fed safeguards. U.S. government officials then stalled on approving the transfer until an executive order issued by President Joe Biden gave them legal authority to block it indefinitely, the sources said.

A spokesman for the New York Fed declined to comment on specific account holders. The U.S. Treasury Department also declined to comment. A spokesman for Myanmar’s military government did not answer repeated calls seeking comment. Reuters was unable to reach officials at the central bank.

Myanmar’s reserves would be managed by part of the New York Fed known as Central Bank and International Account Services (CBIAS), where many central banks keep U.S. dollar reserves for purposes such as settling transactions.

An attempt to empty the account was made on Feb. 4, but was blocked automatically by processes that had been put in place at the New York Fed before the coup, two of the sources said. When the military took charge in Myanmar on Feb. 1, it installed a new central bank governor and detained key economic officials, including Bo Bo Nge, the reformist deputy governor and Suu Kyi ally, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. As of Thursday, he remains under detention, according to the association.

US and UK ratchet up sanctions on Myanmar's military

By Tim McDonald
BBC News (
26 March 2021)

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56248559

Extract: The US and UK have imposed sanctions on Myanmar's two military conglomerates in a move that significantly ratchets up pressure on the country's leadership. Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd (MEHL) control significant portions of Myanmar's economy, with interests across many of the country's major industries. The US Treasury has now added the two companies to a blacklist, freezing any assets they have in the US and banning US individuals and businesses from trading with them. The UK has imposed sanctions on MEHL.

Human rights groups and democracy activists have long pushed for sanctions against the two conglomerates, arguing that they fund the military's repression of protestors. But the US is the only major power so far to impose sanctions on the two businesses, while Myanmar's biggest trade partners in Asia have rejected sanctions. Critics worry that the increased pressure won't be enough to force change. "The leverage is not really there," said Richard Horsey, a Myanmar expert with the International Crisis Group.

One example that lays out the complexity of imposing sanctions and enforcing them is Golden City, a Yangon mixed-use development with an unobstructed view of the city's most famous landmark Schwedagon Pagoda. The activist group Justice for Myanmar says the development is a cash cow for Myanmar's military that channels millions into the military department "which buys weapons of war that are used on the people of Myanmar in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity."

Singapore-listed company Emerging Towns and Cities (ETC) - which owns a 49% stake in the development through a number of local companies - halted trading in February after Justice for Myanmar published the allegations, and the stock exchange demanded the company explain its part in the project. The company admits its partner in Myanmar has ties to the military. It makes lease payments for Golden City into an account administered by the Quartermaster General's Office, which reports to the Ministry of Defence. But ETC denies those funds could have been used to commit human rights abuses, saying that under Myanmar law, the Quartermaster General must turn over all funds to the government's budget account. And it told the Singapore stock exchange (SGX) that's where its responsibilities end. The company suspended trading in early March on the Singapore exchange while it seeks out an "independent" review to clarify its dealings in Myanmar to investors. ETC declined interview requests, and Myanmar's embassy in Singapore didn't respond to requests for comment.

Both critics and proponents of a tougher approach agree that up until now the sanctions - which only targeted Myanmar's top brass - have been fairly weak. Previous sanctions on Myanmar have had a humanitarian impact. For example, the US state department estimated that a 2003 US ban on Burmese textile imports cost 50-60,000 jobs (although orders from the EU mitigated the effect).

Mr Horsey worries that ordinary people rather than the government could again pay the price, especially if the sanctions turn into a broader attempt to bankrupt the state. But if sanctions force western oil and gas companies to withdraw, Mr Horsey expects that businesses from China or Thailand would replace them. China and Thailand account for more than half of the country's trade volume, while Singapore is the single largest foreign investor, generating $11bn over the past five years according to Myanmar government figures.

'US firm Chevron offering lifeline to Myanmar junta'

Chevron prioritizing profit over human life by lobbying for end to US sanctions on Myanmar army, says rights group

Md. Kamruzzaman

Anadolu Agency (May 1, 2021)

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/us-firm-chevron-offering-lifeline-to-myanmar-junta/2226638

Extract: A Myanmar rights group has strongly condemned American multinational energy corporation Chevron’s efforts to lobby the US government to withdraw sanctions on oil and gas businesses owned by Myanmar’s military junta.

“By continuing its work in Burma, Chevron is offering a lifeline to the military to continue the transport of troops to kill and detain protesters, the launching of artillery in civilian areas, and the use of fighter jets to bomb civilian areas in Kachin and Karen state,” the Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN) said in a statement issued on Friday. “Sanctions on the military’s interests, particularly on energy, are one of the only ways the international community can limit the military’s access to foreign cash and limit their ability to purchase the military equipment and fuel they rely on to terrorize the civilian population.”

Amid growing rights abuses in Myanmar, the US, along with the UK and the EU, imposed sanctions on a military junta that has killed hundreds of people during protests against its Feb. 1 coup against the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The London-based BHRN cited a report by leading American daily The New York Times that said Chevron has “lobbied congressmen and the US State Department against sanctioning military-tied companies in the oil and gas sector because it would disrupt Chevron’s operations in the country.” “It is utterly disgraceful that Chevron would use their power to protect their own bottom line while civilians are being murdered in the street by [Myanmar] security forces they are directly funding,” said Kyaw Win, the executive director of the BHRN.

The End of Quiet Diplomacy in Myanmar

The U.N. dials up the pressure campaign against Myanmar’s putschists.

BY COLUM LYNCH

APRIL 7, 2021, 3:27 PM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/07/myanmar-coup-diplomacy-sanctions-burgener-united-nations/

Extract: In the weeks following Myanmar’s military coup, United Nations special envoy Christine Schraner Burgener privately delivered a blunt appeal to foreign diplomats: Shun Myanmar’s military regime lest you lend it legitimacy, impose an arms embargo, and hit the coup plotters with targeted financial sanctions. Make it hurt. In the past, U.N. envoys to Myanmar, including Burgener, and other top officials have largely held their tongues in public, even when the country’s military, known as the Tatmadaw, threatened democracy and carried out mass atrocities against the country’s minority Rohingya Muslims.

The Feb. 1 military coup in Myanmar has changed that. “I have to be loud now so that people understand that this is not acceptable,” Burgener said, who has been criticizing Myanmar’s military rulers as cruel and repressive since the coup in front of the U.N. Security Council and in interviews with the press. She has been privately counseling a broad range of punitive measures against key sectors of Myanmar’s economy controlled by the military, including sanctions on Myanmar’s oil and gas sector. She has also urged sanctions against military economic powerhouses, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC), which own some 120 businesses in construction, pharmaceuticals, insurance, tourism, banking, and precious stone mining like jade and rubies, according to a report by a U.N. fact-finding mission.

 “The military’s cruelty is too severe,” she warned. “Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day [March 27] was marked by some 100 brutal killings by security forces turning against their own citizens, including children, youth, and women. … A bloodbath is imminent.” Burgener’s about-face has won her and U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres rare praise from human rights advocates. “They tried the soft approach. They failed. The shift to speaking the truth approach is definitely something we welcome,” said Louis Charbonneau, the U.N. representative for Human Rights Watch. “The U.N. has taken a very clear, moral, and principled stand and demonstrated clear moral leadership.”

Copying China’s Online Blockade

How other countries’ efforts to control the internet compare with China’s Great Firewall.

By Shira Ovide

The New York Times (March 1, 2021)

https://www-nytimes-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.nytimes.com/2021/03/01/technology/copying-chinas-online-blockade.amp.html

Extract: How do other countries’ efforts to block some websites or control the internet compare with the Great Firewall? Iran and North Korea also have nearly complete control over the internet, and Myanmar and Cambodia are potentially trying to do something similar.

How has Myanmar tried to control people’s online activities? When the coup started last month, the military used brute force tactics to simply blackout the internet temporarily. In some cases, they did it at gunpoint. Now they’re slowly cutting access.

Each morning, people wake up to find new websites they can’t access. For now, it has been fairly easy for people to get around those blocks. The worry is that new technology from China could make the blocks more complete, though we’ve seen no evidence to date of China’s involvement.

How do you explain that in Myanmar people have suffered from too little restraint of the internet and also too much? First, the military spread hatred online against the country’s Rohingya minority group, and now it’s cutting off the internet.

Where democratic institutions are weak and there are challenges over a country’s future, powerful actors will both cut off the flow of information when it suits them and deploy the internet to spread information in their interests. China does both, and so has Myanmar. Though it might seem contradictory, censorship and disinformation go hand in hand.

What’s next? The fear is that China will make the technology and techniques of its internet manipulation system readily adaptable by other autocratic countries. Myanmar is important to watch because if the generals control the internet without decimating the economy, it may become a model for other authoritarian regimes.

With its interests in flames, what will China do in Myanmar?

Carlos Santamaria

GZERO (March 15, 2021)

https://www-gzeromedia-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.gzeromedia.com/amp/with-its-interests-in-flames-what-will-china-do-in-myanmar-2651092839

Extract: China's stakes in MyanmarChina has always been upfront on what it wants from its southern neighbor: a piece of its natural resources and waterways. Beijing wants the generals to restart long-shelved plans for a controversial hydropower dam to generate electricity for China, which locals fear will damage the environment and force thousands to relocate. Beijing is likewise hungry for Myanmar's rare earth metals (production has dropped significantly since the coup, which probably influenced Beijing's recent threat to stop exporting rare earths to the US.) China also needs Myanmar to continue building a natural gas pipeline linking China's Yunnan province to the Kyaukpyu deepwater port in Myanmar's Rakhine state to gain access to the Indian Ocean, where China is competing for maritime supremacy with India.

Beijing in the hot seat. Since the February 1 coup, Chinese interests have come under fire in Myanmar. A lot of the buzz is on social media, which has been rife with rumors that China — the new regime's most prominent international ally — helped the military seize power. Pro-democracy activists also suspect Chinese cybersecurity experts are helping the junta developinternet censorship technology similar to China's own Great Firewall. Despite its long history of shady activity in the country, China has dismissed such claims as fake news, and pushed back against protesters' calls to boycott Chinese products and sabotage the Kyaukpyu pipeline. But Beijing, as always, is worried about instability on its border, and frustrated with the generals' failure to end the post-coup unrest.

On the other hand, if the rising anti-China sentiment turns more violent, China could feel compelled to do something a bit more radical. Non-interference vs Wolf Warrior. Right now, the Hong Kong scenario is more likely. One reason is that China is deeply concerned about its own reputation as a powerful yet benevolent Asian superpower, the main raison d'être behind its COVID vaccine diplomacy. The other is that China has no fond memories of the last time it deployed combat forces abroad. (That was in 1978, when China lost a brief war with Vietnam.)

But if Chinese businesses continue being singled out, Beijing will be wary of looking weak in the face of rising anti-China sentiment on its border. Further unrest could force Beijing's hand and unleash the "Wolf Warrior" — a new, more aggressive brand of Chinese diplomacy that draws it name from a blockbuster film depicting an extreme version of China using military muscle to defend national interests in Africa.

China’s Myanmar Mess

Increasingly, China’s non-action on the Myanmar coup is going against Beijing’s own interests.

By Sarah M. Brooks and Debbie Stothard

The Diplomat (March 16, 2021)

https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/chinas-myanmar-mess/

Extract: For weeks, every speech from Chinese officials on Myanmar has been essentially the same: China is Myanmar’s “friendly neighbor,” and the current crisis is nothing more than an “internal affair” that needs to be resolved by the “people of Myanmar.” At the Security Council in New York, and the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva, China has clung to its position calling for dialogue and national solution – and, with small exceptions for ASEAN and other regional actors, urged the international community to back off.

Chinese policy on international relations has been essentially about building barriers to block criticism of its rights record. When it comes to Myanmar, though, those barriers are working now as bars. Hemmed in on all sides by its own rhetoric, Beijing’s actions are increasingly looking bad for business.

Literally ceding governance in Myanmar to the corrupt cronyism of the military, known as the Tatmadaw, could imperil China’s significant economic interests in the country and the broader region. As many observers have noted, relations between the two countries were warm (and lucrative) under the National League for Democracy. Aung San Suu Kyi both saw the benefits of Chinese investment and engagement, while also burnishing Myanmar’s international image and boosting its potential to integrate into global markets. All this despite her willingness to negotiate with the military, and to defend its reprehensible and genocidal treatment of the Rohingya.

The Tatmadaw, in addition to being more volatile toward investment than the civilian government, has its own reputational and legal risk. It has come under intense scrutiny for its economic holdings. In 2019, a U.N. fact-finding mission dedicated a hundred-page report to assessing the commercial ties of military-backed entities. The experts recommended that “no business enterprise active in Myanmar… should enter into or remain in a business relationship of any kind with the security forces of Myanmar, in particular the Tatmadaw, or any enterprise owned or controlled by them (including subsidiaries) or their individual members, until and unless they are re-structured and transformed.”

These remained, at the time, mostly words on paper. But following the coup, swift bilateral action by the United States, United Kingdom, and others has made doing business with the Myanmar military not only complicated, nor simply unseemly, but flat-out risky for CEOs and shareholders. From China’s perspective, military control of the economy would make continuing “business as usual” a hard sell, and could imperil efforts to further expand their market footprint and integrate into global supply chains.

Explicit support to the junta seems also to be “bad for business” politically. Were Chinese authorities to offer such support, they could risk alienating ASEAN government allies at a time when their regional aspirations are key to managing what Beijing sees as U.S. encroachment in the Asia-Pacific. Active opposition by Myanmar’s citizens to China’s role – real or perceived – in backing the Tatmadaw could turn the tide on carefully-cultivated outreach that had largely improved views of China in recent years. In early March, leaked documents alleged that Chinese officials had secret meetings with members of the military regime to guarantee the security of their oil pipeline; in response, protestors used China’s own language against them, asserting that disruptions or attacks on the pipeline would be “Myanmar’s internal affair.” Public anger has culminated in attacks on Chinese-owned factories in Yangon, much to Beijing’s chagrin.

China’s efforts to build an international framework that would protect itself and others from scrutiny, in the field of human rights or otherwise, have resulted in a cage that limits room for maneuver and jeopardizes competing efforts at economic and political expansion. If it fails to manage the contradiction between ideology and interests, and allows the military regime to steamroll its way to power, China should clearly understand that it’s not just the people of Myanmar but the whole neighborhood that will be worse off.

China to work with ASEAN on promoting peace talks in Myanmar: Chinese FM

Xinhua (2021-04-03) 

http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/03/c_139856764.htm

Extract: China will communicate and coordinate with all parties, while working concertedly with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to promote peace talks in Myanmar and help ease the situation in the country at the earliest opportunity, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said. Wang made the remarks during a one-on-one exchange of views on the Myanmar situation with his counterparts from Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, as part of their visits from March 31 to April 2 in the city of Nanping, Fujian Province.

When holding talks with Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin on Friday, Wang summarized China's stance on the Myanmar issue as "Three Supports" and "Three Avoids." He said China supports all parties in Myanmar in seeking a political settlement within a constitutional and legal framework, and the hard-won democratic transformation process should be constantly advanced. China supports the ASEAN in upholding the norm of non-interference in internal affairs and participating constructively to help ease the Myanmar situation, Wang said, adding that China also supports the proposal of holding a special meeting of ASEAN leaders to discuss effective solutions, Wang said. Shedding light on the "Three Avoids," Wang called for avoiding further bloodshed and civilian casualties in the country.

Milk Tea Alliance: Twitter creates emoji for pro-democracy activists

BBC (Apr 8, 2021)

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56676144

Extract: Twitter has launched a new emoji for the "Milk Tea Alliance" - a movement uniting Asian pro-democracy activists. The alliance has brought together anti-Beijing protesters in Hong Kong and Taiwan with pro-democracy campaigners in Thailand and Myanmar. The emoji, a white cup set against three different shades of a popular regional tea, marks a year since the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag started. One target is Chinese dominance, and Beijing says it is "full of biases".

What is the Milk Tea Alliance? The alliance has united campaigners pushing for greater democracy. It emerged last year from a Twitter dispute between Chinese nationalists and a young Thai actor and his girlfriend, who were accused of supporting democracy in Hong Kong and Taiwanese independence. The movement gained popularity among pro-democracy activists in Thailand who are calling for reform of the monarchy and protesters in Hong Kong who accuse Beijing of harming the territory's democracy. Use of the hashtag spiked again this February after a military coup in Myanmar led to mass protests.

"We have seen more than 11 million tweets featuring the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag over the past year," Twitter said in a post on the platform. The emoji will automatically show up when users post the #MilkTeaAlliance hashtag. What does China say? The Chinese government has criticised the Milk Tea Alliance. The movement has "consistently held anti-China positions, and is full of biases against China," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian told a press conference on Thursday, Bloomberg reported.

My Chinese article on Myanmar with English reference materials:

Made in Myanmar

2017-10-24

https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2017/10/made-in-myanmar.html

Hope this would help. Best wishes from HK.

Auntie

Revised 04/05/2021

 

2021年3月4日星期四

下有對策

政府派電子消費券只會令兩大超市得益?說對了一半

如果你是失業或欠債的小市民,把官府稍後派發的 $5000 電子消費券注入香港最普及的電子支付工具(即:八達通),用來購買兩大超市(即:百佳+惠康)的現金券,就無須趕及在一個月之內用完,也可以私下轉讓給別人套回現金,然後用來交租或還債,解決燃眉之急,對不對?兩大超市勝在分店多,也有多種的電子支付工具可供選擇,年長的街市小商販可能連八達通也沒有安裝(於是無法受惠於今次的派錢行動)。對消費者來說,利用兩大超市出貨,勝在簡單方便。

透過出售超市現金券,小市民突破了官府對電子消費券所設定的各種限制,取回自主權,也令到那 $5000 失去了刺激消費的功能(提示:Multiplier Effect。如果向小市民收購現金券的,是擁有大量現金(犯罪收入)需要洗白的地下社團,那堆現金券就會成為黑錢的載體,然後透過網上平台(跨越國界)轉移。有需要的話,轉換成實物(例如:價錢較高的藥物或洋酒)再轉售又得。萬一你不知道,網上世界有人收集商業機構發行的現金券,兩大超市的現金券頗受歡迎,原因是簡單易用流通量大和普及率高,適合扮演另類貨幣。換言之,兩大超市有可能淪為洗黑錢的幫兇,是得益還是受害,自己想

外國的經驗顯示,另一種把電子消費券套現的方法,是小市民跟商戶達成秘密協議(即:勾結),用電子消費券換取現金而非收取貨物,而商戶就偽造售貨的單據或紀錄,用來瞞騙官府。如果那盤生意不過是門面公司 (Front Company),真正目的是洗黑錢,就有需要偽造售貨的單據或紀錄,用來掩飾黑錢(犯罪收入)的來源,對不對?如果是這種公司,就算裡面有(真的)貨物,門口貼有(假的)招聘廣告,也不過是道具或裝飾品,明白未?坐在裡面的是甚麼人,自己想

另一種把電子消費券套現的方法,應用於特區政府派發給長者的醫療券(每年二千元)。操作方法:家庭醫生看見長者的醫療券戶口內累積的錢頗為接近上限(八千元),開單的時候就收取較高的費用,然後把多收的費用用現金退還給長者,並且告訴長者:醫生沒有多收你的錢!換言之,醫生用現金收買長者(保守秘密),目的是把較多的公帑轉入醫生的口袋中反正時日無多的長者都喜歡袋現金,老人家對電子貨幣也沒有概念,對不對?這種玩法,眼鏡店也懂,所以長者用醫療券配老花眼鏡要收幾千元,哈哈。電子消費券是否也會發展出類似的玩法,自己想。這些低級財技醫生懂,會計師出身的陳茂波懂不懂,自己想

政府可以怎樣?為了打擊洗黑錢活動,個人八達通也玩實名制?還是 $5000 電子消費券也搞實名制,即是全民登記個人資料方便日後追查你們怎樣使用,抓到違法者就要入獄?抑或兩大超市(即:百佳+惠康)的現金券也要配合政府的需要玩實名制?反正港人罵官府擾民,就索性擾民擾到底啦!派錢派到被人罵,陳茂波也不是頭一次了,他是否想趁機向大家報復,自己想

有簡單直接的方法(例如:全面封關派發現金)不用,而是採取一些不受歡迎的措施(例如:安心出行+執檯專員)或只做門面功夫(例如:電子消費券),是特區政府的慣技結果是:原有的問題沒有得到解決,又衍生出一些新的問題,然後新舊問題夾纏不清,自己搬起石頭砸自己的腳,而且是不止一件石頭,是笨得要命還是自取滅亡,自己想。後果必然是:小市民消極抵抗(例如:拒絕安裝安心出行並且使用假名字或假電話號碼填表登記),年輕人就用創意手法破解(例如:修改手機設定令安心出行」無法紀錄行蹤),結果變成一個貓捉老鼠的遊戲 Tom & Jerry,圖),即是沒完沒了的消耗戰。正所謂:「飯桶在機關,高手在民間。上有政策,下有對策。」以港人頭腦之靈活,這個遊戲肯定有排玩。表面上,年輕人向官府發動的城市游擊戰好像暫停,但是商業領域的官民角力卻沒完沒了。矛盾和衝突像火山融岩,不斷地轉移和流動,見縫覓路,轉換形態,但是無法冷卻,即使流入海洋也不會徹底熄滅,而是化為海底的一條星火路,繼續蔓延開去。

執行政策的公務員夾在中間,肯定不好受,再加上要宣誓效忠(基本法)以及動不動就被(愛國傳媒)發動文革式批鬥,部份人索性辭職移民去。本應是電子消費券得益者的餐飲零售業也會被官府玩殘(提示:安心出行+執檯專員)。官府以為派發電子消費券就可以令電子支付平台普及化,然後支付寶或微信支付在香港的市場佔有率上升,終於超越八達通成為那個行業的龍頭?沒有那麼簡單,結果可以是無人得益。這種水平的人負責管錢?難怪外國勢力也來抽水(提示:彭博引述陳茂波+不排除再上調股票印花稅),令港股一跌再跌,中港股民一起爆粗,影響國家金融安全。

插圖來源:互聯網

延伸閱讀/參考資料:

Investopedia – What is Multiplier Effect

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/multipliereffect.asp

The multiplier effect refers to the proportional amount of increase, or decrease, in final income that results from an injection, or withdrawal, of spending.

Key points:

  • The multiplier effect refers to the proportional amount of increase, or decrease, in final income that results from an injection, or withdrawal, of spending.
  • The most basic multiplier used in gauging the multiplier effect is calculated as change in income / change in spending and is used by companies to assess investment efficiency.
  • The money supply multiplier is also another variation of a standard multiplier, using a money multiplier to analyze effects on the money supply.

Understanding the Multiplier Effect. Generally, economists are usually the most interested in how capital infusions positively affect income. Most economists believe that capital infusions of any kind — whether it be at the governmental or corporate level — will have a broad snowball effect on various aspects of economic activity. As its name suggests, the multiplier effect provides a numerical value or estimate of a magnified expected increase in income per dollar of investment. In general, the multiplier used in gauging the multiplier effect is calculated as follows:

2021 特區政府財政預算:發放消費券

https://www.budget.gov.hk/2021/chi/speech.html

46. 面對目前的特殊環境,政府應善用財政儲備,適時為市場注入動力,刺激經濟,帶動消費市場及其他經濟環節加速復蘇。經詳細考慮,我會向每名合資格的十八歲或以上香港永久性居民及新來港人士,分期發放總額五千元的電子消費券,鼓勵及帶動本地消費。預計措施可惠及約七百二十萬人,涉及約三百六十億元財政承擔。政府會物色合適的儲值支付工具營辦商協助推行計劃,並會盡快公布計劃細節。

$2 乘車擬實名制 長者需用有相八通達

晴報 2020/11/27

https://skypost.ulifestyle.com.hk/article/2813672/$2

節錄:施政報告提及,下個財政年度將落實 2 元乘車優惠將降至 60 歲。特首林鄭月娥昨稱,為防濫用,計劃將逐步轉為「實名制」,合資格人士需持有個人相片的八達通卡。有關注團體建議,計劃可按現有機制盡快推行,以免市民憂「實名制」或觸犯私隱。政府表示,計劃現已大致完成內部評估,並將納入下年度財政預算案,冀同年度內逐步落實。林鄭表示,計劃相當昂貴,但強調已有時間表及路綫圖。資料顯示,運輸署過去 3 年實地監察,調查發現 339 宗懷疑濫用個案,另有 66 宗個案被判罪成。民建聯立法會交通事務委員會副主席陳恒鑌稱,計劃進度過於緩慢,指政府以打擊濫用作藉口,要求盡快落實;長者換領實名八達通亦應從簡,如考慮在社會福利署的長者卡加入八達通功能,一卡多用。

中大內地教授李薇疑用長者八達通搭港鐵 深水埗站內遭查票拒合作

HK01 (2021-01-17)

https://www.hk01.com/

節錄:網上瘋傳一段中年女子昨午大鬧深水埗港鐵站的影片,事後有人認出該名女子為中文大學政治與行政學系助理教授李薇。片中可見,該名女子遭 6 名港鐵職員包圍查票,被要求出示身份證明文件,惟她拒絕合作,稱:「我用錯八達通!」及說出自己的身份是「中文大學老師」。事後有警員接報到場調查,她向警員大呼:「係你哋唔啱!我係用錯咗八達通,你哋就拉我!」。警方指,該名 39 歲姓李女子最終向港鐵職員出示身份證明文件以作票控用途。據悉,有人報稱自己用錯父親持有的長者八達通。

2004 年女子賣百佳現金券「種金」涉款 600

蘋果日報 2014 10 21

https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/realtime/article/20141021/53036193
節錄: 2004 年就有騙徒以百佳超級市場現金券作「種金」工具,約 400 多人中招,涉及約 600 萬元,大批苦主在同年 10 21 日報案揭發案件。自 2001 年起,一名於大埔開設售賣報刊、雜誌及二手舊書的店舖女東主,以「訂報紙送禮券」作招徠,顧客訂購 3 個月報紙則送一張 50 元禮券,訂購半年則贈送 3 張。其後,女東主轉為以正價 7 8 折出售百佳禮券,但購買者須先付款,若在付款後兩個星期取券即有 8 折,一個月後才取禮券更享 7 折優惠。由於最初顧客取得的禮券並無問題,故不少街坊不虞有詐向該店訂購禮券,當中不乏士多及雜貨店東主,購買大量平價禮券到百佳入貨。直至該年 10 11 日,有顧客到店內領取禮券不果,職員更砌詞推搪指數日後便可領取禮劵,但一名訂購了 10 張價值 100 元面額禮券的顧客於 10 15 日到店舖希望領回禮券時,卻發現店舖並無開門,隨即懷疑受騙報警。警方遂將女東主帶走調查。當時有人承認投資失利,經濟拮据,更欠下店舖近 30 多萬元租金,懷疑與投資失利有關。(Auntie 的評語:用超市現金券玩非法集資

憂再加稅港股倒插

東方日報 2021-03-03

https://orientaldaily.on.cc/cnt/finance/20210303/mobile/odn-20210303-0303_00202_004.html

節錄:昨有報道指,港府不排除再調高股票印花稅,大市隨即由升轉跌,即使其後更正為只是無計劃撤回印花稅,惟市場憂慮未減,恒生指數曾倒跌近 500 點,全日挫 356 點,險守兩萬九關。外媒報道,財政司司長陳茂波受訪時稱,股票交易稅對於高頻交易員來說為成本的一小部分,增加印花稅並不會影響到本港股市的競爭力。他又指,調高股票印花稅幅度溫和,現階段無意承諾撤回或進一步上調,港府會監察情況和市場發展。立法會議員張華峰直言,不要再向金融服務界開刀,更反問陳氏是否「計錯數」,質疑港府想將 2,576 億元的赤字全由金融業承擔。他形容,在疫情下,金融服務業是香港一隻「會生金蛋嘅雞」,業界亦支撐以數萬計的家庭生計,增加印花稅絕對是「殺雞取卵」,損害香港國際金融中心地位,強調加稅是「得不償失」。

Hong Kong Explores SPAC Listings to Get In on Deal Boom

By Kiuyan Wong and Stephen Engle

Bloomberg 2021-03-02

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-02/h-k-finance-chief-says-stamp-duty-won-t-harm-competitiveness?srnd=economics-vp

Extract: The government has asked the Hong Kong exchange and the city’s financial regulator to look into having SPACs list, according to Financial Secretary Paul Chan. “We are looking at it seriously,” he said, without providing a time-line.

The initial steps into SPACs come after the city shook markets last week by raising the stamp duty on stock trading by 30% to 0.13% as part of an effort to boost spending and relieve economic distress amid a record budget deficit and the highest unemployment in 16 years. Shares sold off broadly on Wednesday as the budget was announced, sending the stock of the city’s bourse plunging almost 9%.

Chan hit back at criticism that the move would harm the financial hub. “According to the information available to us up till now, we don’t think this modest increase in stamp duty has in anyway harmed our competitiveness,” he said. The government has no plans to withdraw the hike and isn’t at this time planning any more increases, he said. ”We will continue to monitor the situation, the market development and at this stage, I will not commit one way or the other,” Chan said.

Hong Kong’s Illusionist

Financial Secretary Paul Chan invokes a system that no longer exists.

By the Editorial Board, WSJ (Mar 11, 2021)

https://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kongs-illusionist-11615419340

Extract: We almost sympathize with Paul Chan Mo-po, who writes a letter to the editor nearby. The Hong Kong Financial Secretary is upset that the Heritage Foundation has dropped Hong Kong from its annual Index of Economic Freedom after years at the top of the list. Mr. Chan has the impossible task of denying what everyone can plainly see: China’s Communist Party is remaking Hong Kong in its own Mainland image. 

That was the point of Heritage’s Ed Feulner in his explanation on these pages last week. Until Singapore took the top spot on the index, Hong Kong had reigned as No. 1 for 25 years. As the preface to the 2019 Index noted, “The Hong Kong government has taken out full-page ads to tout its number-one ranking.” But China’s aggressive assimilation of Hong Kong, Mr. Feulner wrote, is turning it into merely one more Chinese city. Mr. Chan disagrees, invoking “the principle of One Country, Two Systems.” This was the promise of autonomy for Hong Kong embodied in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration that set out the terms of the former British colony’s return to China. What Mr. Chan does not say is that Beijing has made clear the Joint Declaration is a dead letter.

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2019 12 6

https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2019/12/blog-post.html
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炒黃牛飛

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https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2019/04/blog-post.html
節錄:香港出現過運用(超級市場)「現金券」進行非法集資或清洗黑錢的騙局。在網上世界,有人專門收集各大商業機構所發行的「現金券」,然後用來玩財技或進行詐騙。背後是甚麼人,自己想。兩大超市(即是:百佳、惠康)的「現金券」似乎頗受歡迎,欲知詳情,請上網。

洗黑錢督數偽術

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http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2018/04/blog-post_14.html

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Leapfrogging(蛙跳模式)

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https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2017/11/leapfrogging.html
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https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/10/part-2.html

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健康碼 = 敲脚骨 + 分餅仔 

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http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/06/blog-post_20.html

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http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2013/06/blog-post_20.html

節錄:教育、醫療和社福三方面的開支被視為沉重的包袱,既然是包袱,就要想辦法減輕負擔,港式官僚的慣技,是把包袱推卸給別人,亦即是:提倡「用者自負」(例如:「個人醫療儲蓄戶口」即是俗稱的「強醫金」)、減少政府資助(例如:縮短資助藥物名單,迫使公立醫院的病人自掏腰包購買療效較好但是較昂貴的藥物),以及鼓勵有負擔能力的中產轉用私營機構(例如:醫療券、醫療保險)。

雙軌制(四)

2011 11 20

http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2011/11/blog-post_20.html
節錄:當權者的如意算盤,是試圖擺個姿態,表達一點解決問題的誠意,但是不會觸碰到問題的真正根源(即是:地產霸權,基金公司的利益,中港兩地人口政策的差異)。究其原因,當權者也許是不想得罪某些在政治上有影響力的既得利益集團(例如:地產商),怕會遭到報復或者反撲,累及兒孫。自私動機,不難理解。民國奇書<厚黑學>中,這種處事方法叫「鋸箭法」。

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https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/03/counter-cyclical.html
節錄:所謂的「逆周期」政策 (Counter cyclical policy) 是指官府透過適當的貨幣或財政政策工具(圖)去減輕經濟周期波動所帶來的負面影響(例如:失業或通脹),政府嘗試扮演一個穩定因素 (Stabilizing factor),稍為減輕一下老百姓的痛苦,好讓奴隸繼續當奴隸,跟隨既定的遊戲規則玩下去,而非起來造反。

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2016 12 28

http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2016/12/blog-post_28.html
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數豆驚魂 

2008 11 23

http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2008/11/blog-post_1594.html
節錄:「做會計師好」不過是外行人的誤解,絕對不是 True and Fair View。這個行業最弔詭的地方是,數豆者 (Bean Counter) 每日與公司賬目為伍,卻由於職業訓練以致目光如豆,迷失於由會計法則所建造的迷宮當中,眼中只見一塊樹葉的其中一段葉脈,卻無視整片森林的榮枯。數豆者無法掌握經濟週期,尤其是對轉角位欠缺敏感度,結果是初入行者遭殃。

Revised 12/03/2021