數碼貨幣 (Part 3)

Recap: 數碼貨幣可以是由現實世界的中央銀行發行（Central Bank Digital Currency, CBDC），直接受政府監管。虛擬貨幣 (Virtual Currency) 是數碼貨幣的分類，是由私人機構發行因此不受政府監管的數碼貨幣 (Digital Currency)，可以在虛擬世界中用作支付工具。而運用區塊鏈 (Blockchain) 技術的加密貨幣 (Cryptocurrency) 是虛擬貨幣 (Virtual Currency) 的其中一種（例如：Bitcoin）。由於加密貨幣的買賣活動在網上世界進行，即是跨越國界和不受政府監管，有助避開資金管制 (Capital control)，於是成為大陸人的洗黑錢工具，詳情見 (Part 1)。

由於加密貨幣 (Cryptocurrency) 的買賣活動無須經過美元結算體系，另一個常見用途是用來繞過美國的貿易制裁，那是伊朗和北韓的做法。好處是讓受到國際社會孤立的政權可以（透過進行對外貿易或犯罪活動）賺取收入，繼續生存以及發展武器自保，詳情請參考＜延伸閱讀＞部份所提供的英文材料。對，獨裁者也要想辦法賺錢，然後把剝削老百姓所得的錢轉移（洗黑錢），以便在海外建立小金庫，萬一他日被推翻，老婆、情婦和兒孫也有錢用（提示：螞蟻搬家）。至於中國發展數碼人民幣（英語傳媒叫 Digital Yuan）是否也有類似的考慮（繞過美國的貿易制裁），偉大祖國是否跟伊朗和北韓學習（又或者互相抄襲），還是已經被國際社會歸入同一個類別 (Category)，這些大逆不道的殺頭問題，自己想。

［免責聲明：這個系列並非推廣比特幣（Bitcoin）及其他「加密貨幣」（Cryptocurrency），相關的投資風險請參考＜延伸閱讀＞部份由投資者及理財教育委員會（IFEC）和證監會（SFC）所提供的中文資料，如有損失與 Auntie 無關。］

插圖來源：www.fotosearch.com

延伸閱讀／參考資料：

Iran Has a Bitcoin Strategy to Beat Trump

As the United States expands its sanctions, Iran has been ramping up its use of cryptocurrencies to get around them.

BY TANVI RATNA

Foreign Policy (JANUARY 24, 2020)

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/24/iran-bitcoin-strategy-cryptocurrency-blockchain-sanctions/

Extract: In narrow terms, the economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran in the last two years have been effective, shrinking the Iranian economy by 10 to 20 percent. But they have also accelerated Iran’s use of cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, which are increasingly used by the Iranian government and public to evade legal barriers. This has led to an attempted crackdown on bitcoin by international regulators — but the cryptocurrency industry is proving more nimble than the enforcers of sanctions. Iran has clearly understood that cryptocurrencies are among the ways to challenge and subvert the U.S.-dominated financial architecture. In the meantime, as long as holes in regulation exist, they are sure to be exploited by the Iranian regime and people.

The Iranian government has long had an interest in using cryptocurrencies to support international trade outside of the traditional banking system. Multiple blockchain projects — developing the underlying technology for cryptocurrencies — were revealed by the central bank at a digital payments conference last year, one of which is reportedly already being tested by four Iranian banks (three of which are under sanctions). Cryptocurrency transactions are already popular with the Iranian public, according to various reports. In some interviews, people have described bitcoin as the only way to get money out of Iran. Cryptocurrency mining activity, which is a heavy computational process that generates, or “mines,” new cryptocurrency, is also significant in Iran. Interestingly, Iran also appears to have attracted interest from other countries willing to collaborate via blockchain platforms. In November 2018, Iranian and Russian blockchain industry personnel signed an agreement for cooperation in developing Iran’s blockchain industry, with a stated aim to address challenges arising from sanctions.

Despite these challenges, there are new developments in the world of cryptocurrency that may open up new possibilities for the Iranian government and people to evade sanctions. One significant development is the rise of central bank digital currencies, which are the governmental take on cryptocurrencies — central banks issuing natively digital money. China and Russia have notably been working on these projects for some time, and the Chinese sovereign coin, or “digital yuan,” is expected to be launched this year. The implications for international sanctions are vast. First, these projects inevitably run on private blockchains that provide no traceability to outside countries the way a bitcoin network does. The second is that these instruments are completely outside the purview of current U.S.-led global financial architecture. Countries that are still open to cooperating with Iran could easily explore avenues through the use of such sovereign coins.

North Korean hackers steal billions in cryptocurrency. How do they launder it into real cash?

by Patrick Howell O'Neillarchive, September 10, 2020, published on MIT Technology Review

https://www.i-aml.com/post/north-korean-hackers-steal-billions-in-cryptocurrency-how-do-they-launder-it-into-real-cash

Extract: For years, North Korea’s Kim dynasty has made money through criminal schemes like drug trafficking and counterfeiting cash. In the last decade, Pyongyang has increasingly turned to cybercrime — using armies of hackers to conduct billion-dollar heists against banks and cryptocurrency exchanges, such as an attack in 2018 that netted $250 million in one fell swoop. The United Nations says these actions bring in vast sums which the regime uses to develop nuclear weapons that can guarantee its long-term survival. 

But there is a big difference between hacking a cryptocurrency exchange and actually getting your hands on all the cash. Doing that requires moving the stolen cryptocurrency, laundering it so no one can trace it, and then exchanging it for dollars, euros, or yuan that can buy the weapons, luxuries, and necessities even bitcoins cannot. “I’d say the laundering is more sophisticated than the hacks themselves,” says Christopher Janczewski, a lead case agent at the IRS who specializes in cryptocurrency cases. Janczewski was most recently the lead investigator in a case to trace and seize $250 million in cryptocurrency from an unprecedented streak of multimillion-dollar hacks allegedly carried out by the North Korean hacking team known as Lazarus Group.

And, he says, Lazarus’s tactics are continuously evolving. Once Lazarus has successfully hacked a target and taken control of the money, the group attempts to cover up its trail to throw off investigators. These tactics typically involve moving coins to different wallets and currencies　—　for example, switching from ether to Bitcoin. The so-called Lazarus group has used elaborate phishing schemes and cutting-edge money-laundering tools to steal money for Kim Jong-un’s regime. The Lazarus laundering operation, says Janczewski, involves creating and maintaining hundreds of false accounts and identities, a consistent level of sophistication and effort that underlines just how important the operation is for Pyongyang. It’s extremely difficult to name a precise amount, but experts have estimated that North Korea relies on criminal activity for up to 15% of its income, with a significant portion of that driven by cyberattacks.

No matter how many peels and hops a hacker might throw the stolen cryptocurrency through, the effort usually comes up against an undeniable fact: if you’re trying to exchange a huge amount of cryptocurrency for US dollars, you’ll almost inevitably have to bring it all back to Bitcoin. No other cryptocurrency is so widely accepted or so easily converted to cash. Though new coins and privacy technologies have been emerging for years, Bitcoin and its public ledger remain “the backbone of the cryptocurrency economy,” says Janczewski. That means the ultimate destination of the coin is often an over-the-counter trader — a bespoke operation in a country like China that can turn coin into cash, sometimes with no strings attached. “Now there are a lot more currencies involved. They are able to move through obscure currencies, but eventually they end in the same spot, which is moving it back to Bitcoin and through the over-the-counter market.” Over-the-counter operations are the preferred way for Lazarus to move millions in Bitcoin into cash.

The United States Department of Justice -

Attorney General William P. Barr Announces Publication of Cryptocurrency Enforcement Framework

(October 8, 2020)

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-publication-cryptocurrency-enforcement-framework

Extract: Attorney General William P. Barr announced today the release of “Cryptocurrency: An Enforcement Framework,” a publication produced by the Attorney General’s Cyber-Digital Task Force.  The Framework provides a comprehensive overview of the emerging threats and enforcement challenges associated with the increasing prevalence and use of cryptocurrency; details the important relationships that the Department of Justice has built with regulatory and enforcement partners both within the United States government and around the world; and outlines the Department’s response strategies. 

In Part I, the Framework provides a detailed threat overview, cataloging the three categories into which most illicit uses of cryptocurrency typically fall: (1) financial transactions associated with the commission of crimes; (2) money laundering and the shielding of legitimate activity from tax, reporting, or other legal requirements; and (3) crimes, such as theft, directly implicating the cryptocurrency marketplace itself. 

Part II explores the various legal and regulatory tools at the government’s disposal to confront the threats posed by cryptocurrency’s illicit uses, and highlights the strong and growing partnership between the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Commission, and agencies within the Department of the Treasury, among others, to enforce federal law in the cryptocurrency space. 

Finally, the Enforcement Framework concludes in Part III with a discussion of the ongoing challenges the government faces in cryptocurrency enforcement—particularly with respect to business models (employed by certain cryptocurrency exchanges, platforms, kiosks, and casinos), and to activity (like “mixing” and “tumbling,” “chain hopping,” and certain instances of jurisdictional arbitrage) that may facilitate criminal activity.    

“At the FBI, we see first-hand the dangers posed when criminals bend the important technological promise of cryptocurrency to illicit ends," said FBI Director Christopher Wray.   “As this Enforcement Framework describes, we see criminals using cryptocurrency to try to prevent us from 'following the money’ across a wide range of investigations, as well as to trade in illicit goods like criminal tools on the dark web. For example, the cyber criminals behind ransomware attacks often use cryptocurrency to try to hide their true identities when acquiring malware and infrastructure, and receiving ransom payments. The men and women of the FBI are constantly innovating to keep pace with the evolution of criminals' use of cryptocurrency."

相關的文章：

數碼貨幣 (Part 2)

2020 年 10 月 7 日

https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/10/part-2.html

節錄：在中美關係惡化的背景下，中國央行與其被動地回應，被（國際社會）邊緣化，倒不如採取主動，爭取成為設定行業標準的先行者 (First Mover)，順便把法定貨幣（人民幣）數碼化（提示：化粧＋喬裝＋黃子華），一來保住中國央行的地位，二來保障國家主權及金融安全，三來讓中國可以繼續進行對外貿易（即：對抗美元霸權或繞過貿易制裁），一舉數得。

數碼貨幣 (Part 1)

2020 年 10 月 7 日

https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/10/part-1.html

節錄：中美關係惡化又同時牽動了中共內部的派系鬥爭，令局內人覺得危在旦夕，有急切需要尋找新的走資渠道，安排後路及安頓家人。同一時間，疫症蔓延令經濟活動或停頓或半停擺，很多人無法出門，被迫長時間留在家中，透過互聯網跟外面的世界保持聯繫。在這種情況下，不受監管的加密貨幣 (Cryptocurrency) 正好符合大陸貪官的走資需求。

打機兼洗錢

2019 年 11 月 16 日

https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2019/11/blog-post_16.html
節錄：然後用真金白銀（或信用卡）購買虛擬武器，或累積了虛擬貨幣 (Virtual currencies) 或虛擬資產 (Virtual assets)，提供了儲存價值 (Store value) 的功能，作用等同現實世界中的貨幣，但沒有官方認證也不受監管。參與者可以透過交出戶口，或透過網上交易平台或社交媒體帳戶買賣虛擬貨幣或虛擬資產或虛擬武器，從而達到轉移犯罪收入的真正目的。

地獄黑仔王

2020 年 8 月 13 日

https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/08/blog-post.html

節錄：中美關係惡化，蔓延到金融領域，在美國有業務的中資銀行可能有麻煩，萬一被排除於美元結算系統以外，日常營運肯定會受影響，今次中銀又是首當其衝。根據國際傳媒的報導，中銀內部已經進行相關研究，開始準備應變計畫，請參考＜延伸閱讀＞部份所提供的英語報導。

The Frontman of Rocket Man

2017 年 9 月 28 日

http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2017/09/the-frontman-of-rocket-man.html
節錄：中國四大國有銀行在美國有分行，如果任何一間被美國的金融監管機構抓到替北韓提供服務的把柄，又或者是替金家成員清洗黑錢的證據，後果可以很嚴重（例如：被美國凍結資產、被迫切斷跟美國金融系統的聯繫、客戶逃亡引發擠提、在香港的股價立即下跌），澳門滙業銀行的擠提風波（2005 年 9 月中）是好例子，請參考＜延伸閱讀＞部份所提供的資料。

偷龍轉鳳

2017 年 4 月 26 日

http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.hk/2017/04/blog-post_26.html
節錄：異曲同工的做法，是二戰期間的納粹德國。德軍除了掠奪猶太人的財富，然後把他們送入毒氣室之外，還使用偽做的英鎊和美元，以支付龐大的軍費開支，同時擾亂英美兩國的金融系統，試圖削弱對方的作戰能力。德國電影 The Counterfeiters (2007) 紀錄了這一筆。故事改編自真人真事，讓你明白金錢在戰爭中所起的作用。

22/10/2020

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