Credit:
https://ch.linkedin.com/in/pietro-odorisio-30ab009a
前言:Pietro
Odorisio 是歐洲人,姓氏來自意大利,用英文出 Post,經常轉發一些發生在歐洲的洗黑錢案件(部份牽涉中國人),他會提供案件的重點以及分析評論,還有歐洲傳媒的相關報導(英文或歐洲語文的版本)。他也會指出歐洲跟美國在反洗錢方面的執行方法有何不同。以下轉發兩段他的貼文,給讀者參考。第一段提到歐洲跟美國在反洗錢方面的異同,第二段是一份研究報告的重點,主題是英國經濟對非法資金(黑錢)的依賴程度。
延伸閱讀/參考資料:
Pietro Odorisio: "Money laundering is poison for the economy and finance"
Dec 10 2024
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/pietro-odorisio-money-laundering-poison-economy-finance-kd6qf
Excerpt: Pietro Odorisio is an Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Consultant with a deep passion for regulatory compliance and financial crime prevention. His professional background seamlessly combines academic knowledge with practical experience, positioning him as a thought leader in the world of financial integrity.
With his rich background in political philosophy and business ethics, Odorisio has carved a niche as a strategic practitioner who transforms complex regulatory challenges into practical solutions. “Money laundering is a poison for the economy and finance, causing major social disruption and destabilizing entire sectors,” Odorisio asserts.
Q: Given the international context, what differences do you see between compliance models in different European regions? How do these variations impact global business strategies?
A: European regulations follow a common framework, but individual countries often introduce significant variations, creating challenges for multinational companies. For example, some jurisdictions enforce KYC rules more strictly than others, and these discrepancies require tailored strategies to ensure compliance without compromising operational efficiency.
Q: From your experience, what are the main red flags for detecting suspicious transactions? How should companies effectively address them?
A: The main red flags include inconsistencies in client-provided data, transactions that are not aligned with the client’s economic profile, repeated transactions just below reporting thresholds, and money flows directed to high-risk jurisdictions.
Companies should address these issues by combining advanced monitoring technologies with skilled personnel capable of quickly analyzing anomalies and taking timely actions.
Q: How do you strike a balance between a rigorous KYC process and a smooth, non-intrusive user experience?
A: The key lies in adopting a dual approach: on the one hand, professionals must make the KYC process as non-intrusive as possible by leveraging advanced technologies and streamlined procedures to minimize impact on the user experience. On the other hand, institutions must educate clients on the importance of these controls, emphasizing that KYC is not an invasion of privacy or a limitation of freedom but rather a means to maintain financial integrity.
Money laundering is a poison for the economy and finance, causing significant social disruptions and destabilizing entire sectors. KYC processes should therefore be viewed as a tool to protect both individuals and the broader economic system, helping to combat potential criminal activities. Building this awareness can transform regulatory compliance into a shared and meaningful responsibility.
"Technology enhances, but does not replace, the importance of human expertise and capabilities"
Q: From your perspective, which sectors - both emerging (blockchain, crypto) and traditional (real estate, insurance) - are most vulnerable to money laundering?
A: Traditional sectors such as banking, insurance, and gambling, along with other classic financial activities, have always been at high risk for money laundering. However, they are also among the most prepared to combat it, as evidenced by the growing number of suspicious transaction reports.
On the other hand, there are new areas, not strictly financial, that
are less covered or more resistant to adopting preventive measures. For
example, the legal and accounting professions, such as lawyers and
accountants, are approaching these activities with understandable reluctance. Additionally, sectors like entertainment, cinema, and sports
handle enormous financial flows that are difficult to trace, representing a
significant vulnerability. These areas require enhanced monitoring and
greater awareness of the importance of adopting effective preventive measures.
Pietro
Odorisio 的貼文
The UK remains one of the main global hubs for illicit
financial flows.
A recent report by the The Finance Innovation Lab estimates that at least £325 billion of “dirty money” flows through the country each year more than 10% of GDP.
When including Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories (e.g. Jersey, Cayman Islands), the figure rises to over £788 billion annually.
The estimate covers:
- money laundering
- corruption
- tax evasion
- illegal trade
This is the first structured attempt to quantify illicit financial
flows linked to the UK, combining cross-border data on financial crime and tax evasion.
Key points:
- approximately £26 billion per year lost to tax evasion
- increasing political pressure to strengthen the response to financial crime
- systemic role of the City of London and offshore jurisdictions
The report highlights three priority areas:
- Crypto: growing exposure to AML risks and opaque transactions
- Transparency: need for beneficial ownership registers in UK-linked jurisdictions
- Enforcement: increased funding for authorities (e.g. National Crime Agency, Serious Fraud Office)
The findings come ahead of the Illicit Finance Summit 2026, where the UK will be expected to define its position between financial competitiveness and system integrity
The full report is available for download at the following website:
The
UK’s Dirty Money Problem: Estimating the scale of illicit flows in the UK
financial system
May
24, 2026
https://financeinnovationlab.org/insights/uk-dirty-money-problem/
Feedbacks
My work reveals where there’s money and power being shifted, UK’s London Square Mile is often at the centre.
Trouble is, our legal and justice system is the ‘best you can BUY” (but being operative word and not necessarily about payment and value)
Our Government is made up of former lawyers, bankers and other professions that know how to use and manipulate laws.
The people? Well let’s just say, they are still sleeping; let’s not disturb.
Nothing
will ever change; until a country’s people demand better.
相關的文章:
Pietro Odorisio (Part 1)
2026 年 7 月 1 日
https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2026/07/pietro-odorisio-part-1.html
節錄:以下提供一份清單,列出常用的洗黑錢手法,以及解釋操作方法。這是我看過的最完整版本,簡單易明。作者是 Pietro Odorisio,發表於 LinkedIn,日期是 2025-09-19。只要你知道什麼是洗黑錢(提示:Placement, Layering, Integration)都應該看得懂。
Follow the money (Part 1)
2025 年 9 月 17 日
http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2025/09/follow-money-part-1.html
節錄:以下文章轉發自 LinkedIn,作者 Pietro Odorisio 是金融罪案專家,講述意大利法官 Giovanni Falcone 的貢獻。Giovanni Falcone 被黑手黨用炸彈暗殺,但是他的理念及開創的調查手法成為反洗錢 (AML) 法規的指導思想。肉身粉碎,精神長存,繼續跟惡勢力鬥爭。
離岸中心(二)
2009 年 1 月 4 日
https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2009/01/blog-post_04.html
節錄:部份「聰明」的共產黨員開始發覺不妥,因為國內的投資渠道少得可憐又或者回報率偏低,而黨內的無日無之的權力鬥爭,一波又一波的清黨運動,又令他們隨時性命不保,甚至抄家滅族,於是有人開始秘密地在海外建立小金庫。把國有資產存入資本主義陣營的金融體系,是共產主義的優良傳統。高舉無產階級革命旗幟的共產黨,其實念念不忘資本主義的好東西。冷戰時期,蘇聯不可能把國有資產直接存入美國的金融體系,因為隨時會被凍結,而且會走漏風聲,洩露國家機密。於是把錢存入歐洲的銀行,這樣做的好處很多:
FATF 的灰名單和黑名單
2026 年 1 月 6 日
http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2026/01/fatf.html
節錄:被列入黑名單 (Black list) 的國家包括北韓(Democratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK) 和 Iran(伊朗)。至於同樣被西方世界視為「邪惡軸心」(Axis of evil) 的俄羅斯,情況較為複雜。俄羅斯在 2022 年 2 月底入侵烏克蘭,FATF 於 2023 年 2 月把俄羅斯 suspend membership,但沒有把俄羅斯放入灰名單 (Grey list) 或黑名單 (Black list)。歐盟的成員國的議員形容 FATF ‘toothless’ on Russia,廣東話叫「無牙力」,即是懲罰措施不痛不癢,沒有殺傷力。歐盟委員會 (European Commission) 索性不等 FATF 出手,把俄羅斯視作洗黑錢的高危國家處理,放入自訂的黑名單內。
英倫黑錢
2022 年 3 月 1 日
https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2022/03/blog-post.html
節錄:英國傳媒的看法:中國人很可能繼俄羅斯人之後,利用英國的金融中心地位洗黑錢。英國的政府部門已經準備收緊移民政策及加強相關的反洗黑錢法規。今日的西方世界視俄羅斯和中國為敵人,有這種想法,不難理解(提示:英國和美國因應俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭,準備在金融層面對俄羅斯實施制裁)。如果屬實,那些來自俄羅斯和中國的黑錢,稍後是否又要轉移到另一個地方(傳統的避稅天堂還是網上的虛擬世界)?
金融中心的黑暗面
2020 年 1 月 15 日
https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/01/blog-post.html
節錄:金融中心也為間諜活動提供方便(因為收買情報和策劃各種行動都需要錢財),所以你會見到逃亡到倫敦的俄國間諜被下毒。對,金錢吸引鬼魅魍魎。外國學者說:金融業過度膨脹,令經濟發展失去平衡,導致災難性的後果(提示:Too big to fail)。每次金融泡沫爆破之後,幾代人的努力煙消雲散,年輕人向上流動更加困難,缺乏安全感,不婚不育,人口老化,日本是好例子。
Deutsche Bank in troubles, again
2026 年 2 月 8 日
https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2026/02/deutsche-bank-in-troubles-again.html
節錄:俄羅斯或中國權貴的白手套除了轉錢之外,同時兼具情報功能。表面上的身份,可以是:富商、慈善家、企業高層、愛國華僑、足球隊班主、傳媒人或傳媒老闆。具備合法身份,需要銀行服務。亦即是說,外資銀行向白手套提供服務,有可能被捲入間諜戰。客户當中有沒有雙重間諜,自己想。外資銀行要跟白手套或間諜打交道,一不小心就被捲入洗黑錢醜聞,然後要繳交巨額罰款兼聲譽受損。外表光鮮的銀行業其實很難做,也非常兇險。德意志銀行的故事,是一個發展中的 Case Study。
德意志+鐮刀幫+美國總統
2020 年 7 月 23 日
https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2020/07/blog-post_23.html
節錄:德銀也跟匯豐一樣,因為(九十年代)進軍中國和美國而被捲入政治漩渦。這間銀行所走過的路,讓你明白金錢和權力之間的複雜關係,以及金錢在國際政治中所扮演的角色。跟匯豐一樣,德銀於九十年代進軍美國市場,曾經借錢給一個做地產生意的美國佬,日後美國佬在 2016 年的總統大選中勝出。對,他叫 Donald Trump(中譯:特朗普、川普)。若干年後,一間俄國國營銀行成為部份貸款的 Underwriter,消息來源這樣說:
Kompromat
2026 年 2 月 21 日
https://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2026/02/kompromat.html
節錄:誰人最有資格玩這一套?答案是間諜出身的普京,他有經驗,也有動機。俄羅斯在 2022 年初入侵烏克蘭,被西方世界實施經濟和金融制裁,有必要報復或反擊,目的是延長自己的政治壽命、抗衡制裁或減少經濟層面的副作用。英語傳媒的說法,是美國總統特朗普(川普)有黑材料在普京手上,普京否認,信不信由你。
Kleptocracy(盜賊統治)
2021 年 8 月 20 日
http://xiaoshousha.blogspot.com/2021/08/kleptocracy.html
節錄:由於某國的權力高度集中,再加上政治腐敗,令(非民選的)當權者(竊國者)有機可乘,透過各種手段侵吞公款,然後把國家的財產轉移至對資產提供較佳保障的西方國家。這種情況經常發生於獨裁專政、寡頭統治及軍事統治的政府。如果是依賴某種天然資源的國家,竊國者可能會把那種資源據為己有,交由親信或家人管理營運,然後把所得的收入轉移,在海外建立小金庫,萬一他日倒台,家人也有錢用。如果當權者(竊國者)透過官府補貼或政府資助把公帑轉移至由親信所管理的組織或企業,便是經濟學上的尋租行為
(Rent seeking)。


沒有留言:
發佈留言